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THE GATT, LAw AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC ORGANIZATION. 
By Kenneth Dam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1970. 
Pp. xvii, 480. $15. 
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT. By John H. Jackson. 
New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1969. Pp. xl, 948. $27.50. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,1 popularly known 
as GA TT, is the basic international instrument regulating imports 
and exports of its seventy-six member countries, including the 
United States. Recent events in this country have pointed up the 
immediacy of the need to promote understanding of this vital docu-
ment's main purpose-the liberalization of international trade. 
These excellent books by Professors Dam and Jackson should prove 
to be useful tools in this educative process. 
On November 19, 1970, the House of Representatives passed 
H.R. 18970, entitled "The Trade Act of 1970."2 This bill was re-
ported by the Senate Finance Committee but had riot yet been acted 
upon when the 91st Congress expired; it provided that the "total 
quantity of each category of textile articles ... and the total quantity 
of each category of footwear articles . . . produced in any foreign 
country which may be entered in 1971 shall not exceed the average 
annual quantity of such category produced in such country and 
entered during 1967, 1968 and 1969."3 Annual quantitative limita-
tions were provided for subsequent years as well,4 and the President 
was granted authority to suspend the application of the import 
quotas to any textile or footwear article, upon a determination that 
imports of such article "are not contributing to, causing, or threaten-
ing to cause market disruption in the United States."5 
In addition to these mandatory quotas, the proposed bill autho-
rized the United States Tariff Commission to recommend not only 
tariff increases, but quantitative restrictions, if it determined that 
the latter were necessary to prevent further imports from contrib-
uting "substantially ... toward causing or threatening to cause seri-
ous injury to ... domestic industry ..•. "6 In order to exercise this 
discretionary power, the Commission would have been required to 
make two findings: first, it would have had to determine that the 
imported article undersold the domestic article, constituted "an in-
creasing proportion of apparent domestic consumption," and was 
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947), 
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
2. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
3. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(a) (1970). 
4. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 20l(b) (1970). 
5. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(d) (1970). 
6. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § lll(a) [proposed § 30l(b){l)J (1970). Section 111 
of H.R. 18970 contains a proposed amendment of § 301 of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962, 19 u.s.c. § 1901 (1964). 
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produced at unit labor costs substantially below those of the domes• 
tic article;7 second, the Commission would have had to ascertain 
either that domestic production and employment were declining 
substantially or that import penetration "constitute[ d] more than 
15% of apparent United States consumption" and was increasing 
"by at least 3 percentage points .... "8 
Congressional enactment of these provisions would have violated 
the obligations of the United States under GATT. Indeed, GATT 
contains a general prohibition of quantitative restrictions,11 a prohi-
bition that, ironically, was inserted in response to American pressure. 
Professor Dam quotes one of the chief American negotiators, Clair 
Wilcox, who said that "quantitative restrictions are among the most 
effective methods that have been devised for the purpose of restrict-
ing trade."10 Professor Jackson notes that the longest and most dif-
ficult preparatory negotiations concerned the efforts to dismantle 
quotas,ll which the United States condemned as rigid political de-
vices that ignore consumer demand and are thus more harmful than 
the restrictionism of the I930's.12 Both authors emphasize that quotas 
have a much more stifling effect on trade than do tariffs.18 
It is true that the GA TT prohibition of quotas is subject to cer-
tain exceptions;14 the most important of these are "Restrictions to 
Safeguard the Balance of Payments,''15 which both authors discuss in 
some detail.16 Briefly, quotas may be used when necessary "to fore-
stall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in ... mone-
tary reserves" of the importing country, or "in the case of a contract-
ing party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable 
rate of increase in its reserves."17 Obviously, the quota provisions of 
the proposed trade bill could not have been justified under these 
clauses of GATT; indeed, the report of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means refers to the unfavorable United States balance of 
payments and to the declining balance of trade without even raising 
the question whether the proposed quotas could be reconciled with 
7. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § lll(a) [proposed § 30l(b)(5)(C}] (1970). 
8. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § lll(a) [proposed § 30l(b)(5)(A)] (1970). 
9. GATT art. XI, para. 1. 
10. K. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND !NTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 148 
(1970) [hereinafter DAM]. 
11. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATr 307 (1969) [hereinafter JAC!C• 
SON]. 
12. JACKSON at 310. 
13. DAM at 148-49; JACKSON at 306. 
14. GATT art. XI, para. 2, allows member states to enact import restrictions on 
agricultural or fisheries products when such restrictions are necessary to enforce domes-
tic legislation limiting production; the U.S. has such legislation. For details, see 
JACKSON at 316-21. 
15. GATT art. XII. 
16. DAM at 151-57; JACKSON at 681-87. 
17. GATT art. XII, para. 2(a). 
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GATT.18 Consequently, our principal trading partners in GA TT 
could have claimed "nullification or impairment" of their rights 
pursuant to article XXIII of the treaty.19 Thus, the threats of wide-
spread retaliation against American exports in the event that the 
trade bill should become law20 may have a sound legal foundation. 
This threat of a trade war, widely echoed in the press,21 was probably 
the most powerful reason for the Senate's inaction. Such a war would 
have had serious adverse effects on our balance of trade and thereby 
would have damaged our balance-of-payments position; these results 
would be directly opposite to those expected by the bill's proponents. 
In short, passage of the Trade Act of 1970 would have compelled this 
reviewer to compose an obituary of the institution so brilliantly ex-
plored by our nvo authors. 
Although at this writing-January 1971-new trade bills with 
the same quota provisions have been introduced,22 there are indica-
tions that the assault on GA TT may not be resumed. Indeed, Con-
gressman Mills, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means and author of the trade bill, stated in the closing days of the 
91st Congress that quotas would not be needed if the United States 
and Japan could come to an agreement on textiles.23 Perhaps we can 
expect international arrangements comparable either to the informal 
understandings with Germany and Japan concerning voluntary cut-
backs in imports of steel24 or to the existing Long Term Arrange-
ment on Cotton Textiles, which was negotiated within the frame-
work of GA TT and which permits, unaer specified conditions, 
import restrictions to avert market disruption.25 In any event, Mr. 
Mills seems now to recognize that even so powerful a country as ours 
should try to avoid unilateral tampering with international trade, 
and that acceptable solutions of the problems in this field must be 
found by international negotiations. Hence, the abortive Trade Bill 
of 1970 has enormously increased the timeliness and usefulness of 
the study of GA TT by our authors. 
18. H.R. REP. No. 1435, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15 (1970). 
19. JACKSON at 182. 
20. See Keefe, "Made in Japan" Fuels the Antitrust Furnace, 55 A.B.A.J. 1214, 
1215-15 (1971): 
The real loser by this bill is the American farmer who uses one of every five 
of his acres to produce for overseas consumption, because Japan ••• can shift 
its purchases to Australia and Canada. The European Economic Community 
would like nothing better than to shut off the $500 million annual trade in 
American soybeans used for margerine. • • • Ralf Dohrendorf, the Common 
Market's Commissioner for Foreign Commerce, • • • stated that if the United 
States imposes quotas • • • , the EEC would • • • take steps for equivalent 
retaliation. 
21. E.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1970, at 1, col. 1. 
22. S. 4 &: H.R. 20, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
23. Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1970, at 3, col. 2. 
24. C. FULDA &: W. SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND lNvEsT-
MENT 255 (1970). 
25. For a detailed account, see DAM at 300-09. 
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The difference in length of the two books-Jackson's is twice as 
long as Dam's-does not reflect a difference in quality, which is ex-
traordinarily high in both cases. Professor Jackson's treatise is a de-
tailed and exhaustive analysis of every provision of GA TT. The text 
is interspersed with valuable ancillary information-including a list 
of all waivers granted by the contracting parties,26 a catalogue of all 
practices that have been considered subsidies,27 and a compilation of 
all regional arrangements notified to GATT;28 the book also sup-
plies detailed data on all relevant tariff schedules, protocols, and 
agreements, as well as bibliographical references.29 In short, those 
who wish to penetrate deeply into every corner of the complicated 
GATT language must have the Jackson book. Professor Dam's work, 
on the other hand, is a succinct survey of the same field; it is indis-
pensable for those who need a concise, illuminating treatment of all 
of the important problems but who do not wish to work through a 
more detailed elaboration. 
The central feature of GATT is the commitment of the parties 
to limit tariffs on imports of specific goods. Concessions, which are 
called "bindings," are negotiated through tariff bargaining, and these 
concessions are generalized among member states through the treaty's 
most-favored-nation clause and through its prohibition of discrimina-
tory treatment.30 The enforcement of this system is described by Pro-
fessor Dam in a particularly felicitous passage31 in which he notes 
that " ... domestic contract law and public international law are 
more concerned with assuring that commitments made are carried 
out than with promoting the making of agreements in the first 
place," while GATT " ... has a special interest in seeing that as 
many agreements for the reduction of tariffs as possible are made."82 
If withdrawal of a "binding" were forbidden, the making of such 
concessions would be discouraged. Therefore, the principal treaty 
sanction for an increase of a tariff in violation of a previous conces-
sion is the right of retaliation; injured and interested parties may 
respond to a violation by suspending concessions they have previ-
ously granted to the offending party. 88 This scheme is preferable to 
less flexible enforcement mechanisms because, as Professor Dam 
convincingly explains, "[i]t is better, for example, that 100 commit-
ments should be made and that IO should be withdrawn than that 
only 50 commitments should be made and that all of them should 
26. JACKSON at 549-52. 
27. JACKSON at 885. 
28. JACKSON at 592-98. 
29. JACKSON at 888-916. 
80. JACKSON at 29, 768-64. 
SI. DAM at 79-81. 
82, DAM at 80, 
SS. GATI' arts. XXIll, XXVIII. 
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be kept."8' Thus, "retaliation," a self-help type of device generally 
frowned upon in domestic law, is, "[subject] to established proce-
dures and kept within prescribed bounds, ... made the heart of the 
GA TT system."35 Retaliation works and will continue to work so 
long as the parties find that continued adherence to the GATT tar-
iff system furthers their mutual interests.36 
Insofar as quotas are concerned, we see a different picture. Quo-
tas, as noted above, are more pernicious than tariffs, but the GA TT's 
balance-of-payments exception37 encourages inflation-ridden coun-
tries to adopt quotas rather than tariffs. Professor Dam notes that 
many countries have kept quotas even after their balance-of-
payments position has vastly improved, and that a list of such pres-
ently illegal quotas, primarily involving agricultural products, fills 
over 100 pages.38 It follows, then-as both authors note39-that the 
GATT's regulation of quotas and other nontariff barriers has proved 
less satisfactory than that of tariffs. 
Emergency withdrawal of tariff bindings is explicitly permitted 
under article XIX of GA TT, the so-called escape clause.40 This 
adjustment mechanism is designed to afford temporary relief-usu-
ally in the form of a tariff increase-to a country whose producers 
are threatened with serious injury from increased imports resulting 
from tariff concessions. Both authors discuss article XIX,41 but Pro-
fessor Dam does not mention the United States domestic law on the 
subject, and Professor Jackson devotes only one page to it.42 Jackson 
does note that the 1962 Trade Expansion Act'3 added, for the first 
time, the remedy of adjustment assistance-by way of direct pay-
ments, technical and tax assistance, retraining programs, and the 
like-for firms injured and workers made jobless by imports. He 
also observes that the requirements for escape-clause relief were 
"tightened" by the 1962 Act and that "few if any applications" for 
relief under that Act have been granted.44 In fact, no application for 
escape-clause relief or adjustment assistance under the Trade Expan-
sion Act has been successful because the Tariff Commission has con-
34. DAM at 80. 
35. DAM at 81. 
36. Professor Jackson's proposals for a new International Trade Institution, which 
may consist of a "mandatory code" and an "optional code," do not seem to contain 
anything that would be preferable to the GATT retaliation system. See JACKSON at 
780-85. 
37. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text. 
88. DAM at 165-66. 
39. DAM at 166; JACKSON at 519. Conceivably, Congress might have attempted to 
justify the trade bill quotas as retaliation for the illegal quotas of other contracting 
parties. but this approach was not taken. 
40. Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products, GATT art. XIX. 
41. DAM at 99-107; JACKSON at 553-73. 
42. JACKSON at 566-67. 
43. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
44. JACJtSON at 567. 
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strued the language of that Act45 in such a way as to preclude the pos-
sibility of affirmative recommendations for relief.46 Beginning in 
November 1969, too late for inclusion in either book, a new majority 
of the Commission, reversing previous interpretations of the 1962 
Act, granted petitions for adjustment assistance to firms and workers 
in several cases, 47 and for industry-wide escape-clause relief in two 
cases.48 This development is of crucial importance; the practical im-
possibility of obtaining relief in the United States was inconsistent 
with the philosophy of article XIX of GA TT, which recognizes the 
necessity of an internal-adjustment mechanism in cases in which real 
hardship can be traced to the liberalization of import policies. The 
situation in the United States prior to November 1969 was all the 
more regrettable because individual-adjustment assistance for firms 
and workers is more consistent with the policies underlying GA TT 
than is industry-wide tariff relief under the escape clause. The latter 
withdraws previous concessions and thus interferes with interna-
tional reciprocity, possibly setting in motion retaliating increases; the 
former compensates individual victims of the national policy of free 
trade. The new interpretation of the Trade Expansion Act by the re-
constituted membership of the United States Tariff Commission thus 
makes available a safety valve against pressures for protectionist legis-
lation, thereby strengthening the GA TT system. 
A close interrelationship between GA TT and domestic law ex-
ists, of course, in other areas as well. Perhaps most noteworthy is the 
antidumping law enacted in the United States in 1921,49 a quarter of 
a century before the enactment of GA TT, which deals briefly with 
45. The Tariff Commission must find that " .•• as a result in major part of con-
cessions granted under trade agreements, an article is being imported • • • in such 
increased quantities as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to [a] ••• domestic 
industry •• .'' (19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(l) (1964) (emphasis added)). ", •• [I]ncreased im• 
ports shall be considered to cause ••• serious injury ••• when the Tariff Commission 
finds that such increased imports have been the major factor in causing • • • such in-
jury •• .'' (19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(3) (1964) (emphasis added)). 
46. For details, see C. FULDA &: W. ScmVARTZ, supra note 24, at 399-415, and the 
sources cited therein. 
47. Hoy, Adjustment Assistance Under the Trade Expansion Act: A Critique of 
Recent Tariff Commission Decisions, 6 TEXAS INTL. L.F. 67 (1970). In addition to the 
cases cited by Hoy, the Commission recommended relief in at least three cases brought 
by firms-Barbers Chairs and Parts Thereof, T.C. Pub. No. 320, April 1970; Women's 
and Misses' Dress Shoes, T.C. Pub. No. 323, June 1970; Certain Woven Fabrics, T.C, 
Pub. No. 342, November 1970-and five cases brought by individual workers--
Plastic- or Rubber-Soled Footwear, T.C. Pub. No. 321, April 1970; Piano Actions, T.C, 
Pub. No. 331, July 1970; Protective Footwear of Rubber or Plastics, T.C, Pub. No. 330, 
July 1970; Stainless Steel Table Flatware, T.C. Pub. No. 347; Silver-Plated and 
Staiuless-Steel Table Holloware, T.C. Pub. No. 348, December 1970. 
48. Pianos and Parts Thereof, T.C. Pub. No. 309, December 1969; Proclamation 3964, 
Modification of Trade Agreement Concession and Adjustment of Duty on Certain 
Pianos, 35 Fed. Reg. 3645 (1970). In Nonrubber Footwear, T.C. Pub. No. 359, at 24a, 
January 1971, the Commission recommended by an equally divided vote an increase 
of duties "by a modest amount on a few key categories of imported footwear.'' Note 
the contrast with mandatory quotas! 
49. Antidumping Act, 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1964). 
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this same subject in article VI. In 1967, as a part of the Kennedy 
Round, the GA TT members agreed on an elaborate antidumping 
code,irn which elaborates in considerable detail substantive and pro-
cedural rules with regard to the imposition of antidumping duties. 
This code was ratified by the legislatures of numerous signatories, 
but was not even submitted to the United States Congress. Both au-
thors, in discussing the code, 51 fail to give sufficient attention to the 
controversy within the Tariff Commission concerning the code's con-
sistency with American law,52 nor do they adequately deal with the 
United States statute that directs the Tariff Commission to "resolve 
any conflict between the International Antidumping Code and the 
Antidumping Act, 1921, in favor of the Act as applied by the agency 
administering the Act .... "53 Indeed, the Tariff Commission has not 
mentioned the code in the increasing number of antidumping cases 
that have recently been brought to it for decision. The relevant do-
mestic law that impinges on particular provisions of GA TT should 
not be so neglected. 
Perhaps it should be added that the authors might have improved 
their treatments of the GA TT dispute settlement procedure54 by in-
cluding more detailed discussions of case studies of particular dis-
putes.55 
We may conclude that the two books under review are impressive 
and most useful achievements. They enrich and deepen our under-
standing of the complicated problems of world trade at a time when 
the strongest protectionist movement in decades, one which may have 
suffered only a temporary setback by the defeat of the 1970 trade bill, 
makes such enlightenment more necessary than ever before. A 
healthy economic world order cannot be achieved by torpedoing the 
GATT machinery. Instead, GATT-along with other international 
organizations, imperfect and incomplete as they are-should be 
strengthened and expanded. In short, "[t]he primary goal of policy 
should be expansion, not contraction, of trade.''56 Professors Dam 
and Jackson have shown the way. 
Carl H. Fulda, 
Hugh Lamar Stone Professor of Law, 
The University of Texas 
50. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, CATT Doc. L/2812 app. C (1967), set out in full in JACKSON at 
426-38. 
51. DAM at 167-77; JACKSON at 401-38. 
52. See C. FULDA &: W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 449-50, 454-60. 
53. Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, P.L. No. 90-634, § 20l(a)(l), 82 Stat. 
1345. 
54. See, particularly, DAM at 351-73. 
55. See Hudec, The CATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD 
TltADE L. 615, 636-65 (1970). 
56, First National City Bank of New York, Monthly Letter, Oct. 1970, at 119. 
